PRIVATE NETWORKING & SECURE REMOTE ACCESS

Private networking built to reduce inbound exposure.

Connect authorised users and services to private infrastructure through controlled relay paths. Customer-side agents normally connect outwards, so internal management services do not need to be directly published to the public internet.

Use one service, site or device estate as a bounded pilot.

A SMALLER PUBLIC ATTACK SURFACE

Reach what is private. Keep it private.

DC Core separates the public access layer, control plane, relay mesh and customer-side environment. Each layer has a defined job, and access remains subject to identity, tenancy and routing decisions.

02 / POLICY

Broker access centrally

The control plane applies authentication, authorisation, device ownership, tenancy and command controls before an approved platform action or connection is established.

  • Role-based access boundaries
  • WebAuthn/passkeys for high-trust flows
03 / CONFIDENTIALITY

Choose the right relay mode

Use controlled HTTPS-to-mesh publishing for private services, or L1 end-to-end encrypted mesh connectivity where the payload must remain protected between endpoints.

  • Explicit L0 and L1 models
  • No vague blanket encryption claim

TWO CONNECTION MODES

Match the path to the confidentiality need.

The relay is not described as “blind” in every mode. DC Core makes the connection boundary clear so technical and security teams can choose the right pattern.

L0 / HTTPS TO MESH

Publish an authorised private service

Secured public ingress receives HTTPS traffic, then routes the approved connection through the mesh to the appropriate customer-side agent or service. This supports private application access, monitoring and operational workflows without exposing the underlying compute resource directly.

  • TLS-protected public ingress
  • Platform identity and tenancy controls
  • Suitable for authorised web or service access
L1 / END-TO-END ENCRYPTED MESH

Protect traffic between endpoints

Traffic is encrypted between the communicating users, devices or services. The relay can assist discovery, session establishment or route negotiation, but is not intended to inspect or process the encrypted payload.

  • User-to-device or service-to-service paths
  • Stronger boundary for privileged access
  • Relay-assisted connectivity without payload inspection
NEED LAYER 2?Extend an authenticated Ethernet environment across sites, clouds and edge locations with DC Core Ethernet Fabric.

PRACTICAL USE CASES

One control layer across distributed environments.

Use the mesh to create authorised paths to systems that are difficult or undesirable to expose directly.

Discuss a connection path
  1. 01

    Private application access

    Provide authorised access to an internal web application or service through secured ingress and the appropriate customer-side agent.

  2. 02

    Remote infrastructure operations

    Reach approved devices for monitoring, diagnostics or management without placing a general-purpose inbound management interface on the public internet.

  3. 03

    Site and device connectivity

    Connect remote sites, servers or network-connected systems through authenticated agents and tenant-aware platform controls.

  4. 04

    Phased legacy transition

    Add secure connectivity and visibility around an existing environment while infrastructure ownership or hosting remains with the current operator.

CONNECTION DESIGN

From private resource to authorised path.

The design starts with the target service and who should reach it. That avoids opening a broad tunnel when a narrowly controlled service path is the better answer.

  1. 01 / IDENTIFY

    Map the resource

    Define the service, device or environment, its current network position and the users or systems that need access.

  2. 02 / SELECT

    Choose L0 or L1

    Select controlled service publishing or endpoint-to-endpoint encryption based on the required confidentiality boundary.

  3. 03 / DEPLOY

    Place the agent

    Install an approved agent in a controlled zone and apply the required identity, tenant and routing configuration.

  4. 04 / VERIFY

    Test and observe

    Validate access behaviour, failure handling and monitoring before extending the pattern to more resources.

CONTROL PLANE SAFEGUARDS

A connection is only useful when access is governed.

DC Core does not treat internal components as implicitly trusted. Communication between platform services, agents and endpoints is authenticated and protected within the applicable connection model.

IDENTITY

Strong authentication

WebAuthn/passkeys are supported for high-trust flows, with multi-factor authentication used where applicable for administrative and sensitive platform functions.

AUTHORITY

Role and tenant boundaries

Users receive access to the customers, devices and functions required for their role. API requests are authorised against the relevant user, tenant, device or service identity.

VISIBILITY

Connectivity telemetry

Agent communication, relay availability and response performance contribute to operational monitoring, fault detection and investigation within the managed platform.

ENCRYPTIONExternal platform access uses TLS, with TLS 1.3 where supported. L1 provides endpoint-to-endpoint encrypted mesh communication; L0 terminates public HTTPS at secured ingress before the authorised private route. Application-level encryption outside the platform remains with the workload owner.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Secure path, clear network boundary.

DC Core manages the platform components and connectivity it operates. Your local network and any infrastructure outside that managed path remain under the customer or existing provider.

AreaDC CoreCustomer
Relay platformSecure operation of relay services, control-plane routing, tenant controls and managed agent connectivity.Appropriate use of the platform and reporting suspected misuse or access concerns.
Local networkAgreed secure access paths and network controls inside DC Core-managed environments.Site connectivity, local segmentation, internal firewall policy and third-party network changes outside DC Core control.
EndpointsAgent registration, platform-side ownership and approved lifecycle controls.Endpoint security, operating-system controls and applications not included in the managed service.
User accessPlatform authentication, role-based access and privileged administrative controls.User permissions, suitable MFA adoption and removal of access when no longer required.
Application trafficTransport and relay protection for the selected DC Core mode.Secure behaviour, data handling and encryption inside customer applications and third-party integrations.

COMMON QUESTIONS

Private networking FAQs.

Every customer network is different. We use the first conversation to confirm the target, local constraints and right connection mode.

Does DC Core require inbound firewall ports?

Customer-side DC Core agents normally initiate outbound connections to the platform, so inbound management firewall openings are not normally required. The final network design still depends on the service and customer environment.

Is every DC Core connection end-to-end encrypted?

No. DC Core distinguishes L0 and L1 modes. L0 receives public HTTPS at secured ingress and routes it through the mesh to a private service. L1 encrypts traffic between communicating endpoints, while the relay assists discovery or routing and is not intended to inspect the encrypted payload.

Can private networking be used with existing infrastructure?

Yes. Approved agents can be deployed into customer-hosted, remote or transitional environments. Assurance applies to the DC Core components and connectivity under our control; you or your existing provider remain responsible for out-of-scope infrastructure.

Can global relays store customer tenancy data?

Global relay locations support routing, availability and latency. They are not intended to act as primary storage for customer tenancy data, although encrypted traffic and limited service metadata may be processed as part of normal delivery.

Does private access replace every local security control?

No. It reduces unnecessary public exposure and centralises the managed connection path. Customers still need suitable endpoint security, local segmentation, application controls, user governance and secure third-party integrations.

MAP ONE CONNECTION

Turn a public exposure into a controlled path.

Tell us what needs to connect, where it runs and who needs access. We’ll map the likely L0 or L1 path and a bounded technical pilot.

Map my private network